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I present the precinct result maps from the November, 2011 San Francisco General Election.  For each 
proposition, I also display the correlation between the propositions and the 2011 Progressive Voter 
Index.1
 
 I show the results and offer a little bit of commentary, but here I leave the larger-scale political 
analysis to other people. 
These results are generated from the Preliminary Statement of Vote (PSOV), but the relative 
percentages within the precincts won't change much.  As usual, precinct-level analysis exposes the 
problems with the ecological fallacy, but I conveniently ignore them for these papers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 The SF PVI is a single-number political precinct index where '0' denotes the most conservative precincts and '100' 
are the most liberal precincts.  Please see http://flanalytics.com/Work%20files/Latterman%20PVI%202011.pdf for 
the latest PVI paper. 
 
 
The first map I show is turnout.  By and large, turnout in this election is similar to that of other elections 
with D8 and D7 having the highest turnout.  Much of the talk about this years' elections centered 
around turnout in the Chinese neighborhoods.  The Sunset, parts of the Richmond, and even Vis Valley 
had relatively high turnout, but Chinatown did not.   
Map 1: 2011 turnout 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Prop A, School Bond, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Correlation between PVI and Prop A, 2011 
 
Prop A passed with around 70% of the electorate.  School Bonds usually pass in San Francisco (this 
needed 66.7%).  The correlation between PVI and Prop A was pretty strong, with no real surprises.  This 
did particularly well in D10 (relative to PVI), especially in heavily African-American Bayview/Hunters 
Point (BV/HP).  D2 also passed this a bit higher than expected. 
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Map 2: Prop B, Streets Bond, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Correlation between PVI and Prop B, 2011 
 
The Streets Bond also passed, though just barely.   Other than D10, which also passed this strongly, the 
PVI correlation was tighter than that of Prop A.  D2 didn't support this quite as strongly, with most of the 
other districts coming in the same.  In San Francisco, bond support for most things is usually right at 
about two-thirds, so these races are often won or lost at the margins, an increasingly rare phenomena in 
San Francisco. 
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Map 3: Prop C, City pension reform, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Correlation between PVI and Prop C, 2011 
 
No ballot received more attention and citywide support as the 'City Family' Pension reform measure.  It 
was supported by nearly everyone, as passed with almost 70% of the vote.  Unlike the bond measures, 
support was pretty constant, as nearly all precincts voted for this over 60%.  Support was a little less in 
heavily-union BVHP in D10, but that's about it.  If the SF Labor Council and SF Chamber of Commerce are 
sending out joint emails about this, it's going to pass. 
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Map 4: Prop D, Adachi pension reform, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Correlation between PVI and Prop D, 2011 
 
Meanwhile, Public Defender Jeff Adachi's ballot measure did quite poorly.  There was a strong campaign 
against it (concurrent with Yes on A).  Unlike Prop C, however, support for Prop D fell strongly upon 
ideological lines.  Prop D was seen as the more 'conservative' and austere measure.  It was generally 
portrayed that between Props C and D, whichever received more votes would pass (whether or not this 
was entirely true).   
I figured that Prop C and Prop D would have a strong inverse correlation between them, but this is not 
the case (Figure 6).  Part of the reason for this is analytical, in that the PVI/Prop C scatterplot had no 
strong correlation, and that's reflected in this scatterplot.  It's also clear, though, that some moderate 
precincts, in D2 and D7, voted more highly for both measures.  Some people really wanted pension 
reform. 
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Figure 6: Correlation between Prop C and Prop D, 2011 
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Map 5: Prop E, Ballot measure reform, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Correlation between PVI and Prop E, 2011 
 
Prop E lost by a lot, with only a weak PVI correlation.  D8 and D2, despite having different politics,  
supported this the most.  D8's support came somewhat because the proponent was D8's Supervisor.  
Interestingly, Eastern SOMA and Portola also had a bit more support for this. 
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Map 6: Prop F, Consultant reform, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Correlation between PVI and Prop F 2011 
 
The Campaign consultant ordinance didn't get much attention either way, and lost somewhat narrowly.  
It had a moderately strong inverse PVI correlation, with support again coming from D2, D8, and Eastern 
SOMA.   
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Map 7: Prop G, Sales tax, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Correlation between PVI and Prop G, 2011 
 
This measure attempted to replace a tax lost at the state level, but lost somewhat narrowly along 
predictable ideological lines.  This needed two-thirds to pass.   
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Map 8: Prop H, neighborhood schools, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Correlation between PVI and Prop H, 2011 
 
 At the time of writing, this policy statement is virtually 50-50.  Results fall upon ideological lines, with 
more liberal support of neighborhood schools.  Although this measure had some subtle policy details, 
most people saw it as for-or-against the current an Francisco system.  The only slight deviation off of a 
normal PVI correlation was some Western SOMA precincts supported this a bit more than expected.  
This also did well in the heavily-Chinese neighborhoods of the Sunset, Outer Richmond, Ingleside, and 
Chinatown. 
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